In a rapidly evolving world where alliances fray and superpowers clash, Canada's role in the Indo-Pacific hangs in the balance—adapt or risk being sidelined?
The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada kicked off its first Indo-Pacific Forum in Ottawa on October 1-2, 2025, roughly three years after unveiling Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). This gathering united representatives from the Canadian government, scholars, think tank specialists, business executives, and policy analysts hailing from the Indo-Pacific region. Together, they evaluated the strategy's advancements and provided practical insights on refining Canada's approach amid sweeping global transformations.
The first day, hosted at the Fairmont Château Laurier in Ottawa, delved into the region's evolving security landscape. The second day, conducted under Chatham House Rule at the same venue, explored four key facets of Canada's Indo-Pacific involvement: peace and stability; commerce, economic strength, and supply networks; energy reliability, technology, and breakthroughs; and aid, learning, and community partnerships. During these discussions, attendees reflected on the IPS's initial goals, assessed Canada's accomplishments so far, and brainstormed adaptations to tackle disruptions in worldwide trade and political tensions.
Main Insights
- Pivot and sharpen the Indo-Pacific Strategy for an increasingly competitive world. Canada requires a more focused set of goals, transparent compromises, and deliberate timelines—shifting from a broad array of initiatives to a streamlined plan that boosts economic stability and protection.
- Channel resources into Canada's unique strengths for maximum effect. Enhance specialized skills like maritime surveillance (such as detecting "dark" or unidentified vessels), cyber defenses, misinformation countermeasures, humanitarian aid during crises, and tailored training programs with select allies.
- Build deeper ties with a select group of key partners and smaller multilateral groups. Strengthen collaboration with nations like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Australia, Vietnam, and Indonesia, while engaging ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as needed. For beginners, think of minilaterals as smaller, informal alliances beyond big global bodies like the UN, allowing countries to team up on specific issues without the bureaucracy of larger groups.
- Transform people-to-people connections into Canada's secret weapon. View education, joint research efforts, and community links as long-term investments; update development aid methods to blend ethical values with real-world results that support economic and security aims.
Encore Highlights Video
October 1: Public Discussion on Evolving Security in the Indo-Pacific
Forum organizers, APF Canada President & CEO Jeff Nankivell and Vice-President Research & Strategy Vina Nadjibulla, kicked things off by noting that when Canada introduced its Indo-Pacific Strategy in November 2022, the globe was already in flux. Fast-forward three years, and we're dealing with even greater upheaval. To keep Canada safe, steady, and thriving, we must embrace change, particularly in our international policies. A refreshed IPS will be crucial for navigating this turbulent path. Originally, the strategy mirrored the U.S. stance on the region, but now it demands a rethink due to growing divides with the U.S. and the stark shifts in the Trump 2.0 administration's outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
To shed light on these shifts, the Forum featured Dr. Victor Cha, Head of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Delivering a keynote on the changing security scene in the Indo-Pacific and the Trump team's regional strategy, Dr. Cha highlighted the resurgence of major power rivalries and a departure from the decades-long U.S. approach of trying to integrate China as a responsible player in global affairs. For allies, this breeds uncertainty; they can't anymore balance economic reliance on China with security ties to the U.S.
At the same time, authoritarian nations like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are aligning more closely. Though not a formal counter to the Quad (a grouping of the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia), they're coordinating bilateral actions and parallel efforts that should alarm Canada, the U.S., and Western partners.
The U.S. and China are also turning trade, finance, and even the use of force into weapons, while eroding international norms. Global bodies are struggling: the UN Security Council fails to handle big crises, the World Trade Organization (WTO) can't curb trade weaponization, the G20 lacks real leadership, and BRICS—a group started by China, India, Russia, and Brazil—hasn't delivered a viable new global framework despite its attempts.
Moreover, the U.S. is redefining its view of allies, seeing them as burdens rather than assets, while eyeing adversaries as potential partners. Washington now demands immediate returns on alliances, judging them solely by defense spending as a GDP percentage and trade surpluses with the U.S. Dr. Cha pointed out that while Trump 2.0's foreign policy seems erratic, it's actually predictable in strategy—focusing on these narrow metrics—but unpredictable in execution.
But here's where it gets controversial... This shift could force allies like Canada to scramble for individual deals with the U.S., prioritizing short-term gains over collective Western interests. Is this the end of traditional alliances, or just a wake-up call for countries to step up?
This instability is pushing allies into a reactive mode: initially resistant, they've now pivoted to negotiating directly with the U.S. and taking ownership of these relationships.
Retired Canadian General Wayne Eyre, with his extensive background in leading the Canadian Armed Forces, addressed the hurdles posed by China, another major power. He praised the IPS for accurately portraying China as a disruptive force that's growing more assertive. General Eyre described China's "persistent psychological warfare" in the region, particularly against Taiwan, where Beijing aims to undermine faith in Western backing, Taiwan's defenses, and even its own government—using targeted disinformation to divide Taiwanese society.
He assessed that President Xi Jinping is unwavering in his goal to reunify Taiwan with mainland China, with military drills becoming more intricate and numerous, blurring lines between exercises and actual invasions. Invading Taiwan would be tough, Eyre noted, but China is employing "lawfare"—using legal tactics to shift escalation burdens—and eyeing flashpoints like the Second Thomas Shoal standoff with the Philippines as potential ignition points.
Canada has firsthand experience with China's hostility, including risky interceptions of its aircraft and vessels, which are intensifying. These acts, Eyre explained, intimidate and signal our unwelcome presence, though regional allies assure him Canada is valued. Despite normalizing our Indo-Pacific footprint via the IPS, it has strained NATO commitments, yet Eyre urges doubling down. We must maximize our limited resources for high-impact results, like deterring foes or reassuring friends, by bolstering our defense industry and training with allies, as we've done for Ukraine.
October 2: Core Elements of Canada's Indo-Pacific Involvement (Private Strategic Discussions)
Building on Day 1's themes, the second day emphasized how global upheavals reinforce Canada's need to prioritize the Indo-Pacific. One attendee predicted the current five-year IPS will soon be viewed as a prelude to an even deeper, geography-expanding phase beyond North America and Europe. It also noted strong synergy with Prime Minister Mark Carney's priorities: diversifying trade and safeguarding Canadian autonomy.
Implementing the strategy requires collective effort from beyond the federal government, plus convincing Canadians to care more about the Indo-Pacific. The October ASEAN and APEC summits, including the prime minister's inaugural regional visit, offered a strong starting point.
Session 1 – Peace and Security
Led by Vina Nadjibulla, with contributions from Ty Curran, Brent Napier, Jonathan Berkshire Miller, Vincent Rigby, Nane Baldauff, and Suon Choi, and Professor Stephanie Carvin as Rapporteur, this session evaluated the IPS's security aims, progress and shortcomings over three years, changes under the new U.S. leadership, and ideas for bolstering deterrence, adaptability, and partnerships.
Canada's Department of National Defence and Armed Forces have driven IPS implementation by ramping up regional military activity, such as increasing frigate deployments from two to three for peacekeeping and joining more joint exercises with local partners.
Canada's impact shines through initiatives like Dark Vessel Detection (DVD), a satellite-based system spotting unidentified ships in others' waters. It also prevents maritime accidents, protects underwater infrastructure, and fights illegal fishing—a big issue in the region. Another "niche" contribution: eight cyber attachés across the Indo-Pacific for diplomatic cyber talks and participation in regional security events.
Indo-Pacific participants confirmed Canada's efforts are noticed and valued. DVD has aided the Philippines' maritime monitoring, and collaborations abound: Canada-Japan defense ties now include information-sharing accords and tech transfer talks; Canada-South Korea held their first "2+2" ministers' meeting in 2024. These steps are vital in a region without NATO-style structures.
Suggestions for advancement included:
Boost Canada's role in specialized security fields. While major military buildups take time, Canada can lead in non-traditional areas like disaster relief, disinformation fighting, cyber support, and AI deployment and oversight.
Integrate North Pacific allies into Canada's Arctic defense plans. As an Arctic heavyweight, Canada can tap partnerships with Japan and South Korea, including joint defense industries.
Provide the Philippines with more maritime help, such as data verification skills. This would improve their agencies' shared situational awareness.
Seek entry into emerging regional minilateral groups. Bringing unique assets could attract invites; the Philippines, involved in several such groups, might anchor this.
To rethink security:
Embed the IPS in a comprehensive national security framework. Canada's scattered regional strategies need unification under a cohesive foreign policy, linking Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security. Canada's 2024 Arctic policy pales compared to Asia's robust approaches that weave Arctic ties into broader geopolitics.
Reevaluate Canada's geographic security focus. Should we spread thinly across the region or concentrate on the North Pacific?
Explicitly connect security to other pillars like trade and investment.
Deepen awareness of China's destabilizing effects, including in under-watched areas like the Indian Ocean.
Recognize India's pivotal security role. Could Canada's presence extend to the Indian Ocean, key for global trade and energy routes?
And this is the part most people miss... Extending security ties to the Indian Ocean might redraw Canada's global map, but could it dilute our efforts elsewhere?
Session 2 – Trade, Economic Strength, and Supply Chains
Moderated by Professor Patrick Leblond, with inputs from Sara Wilshaw, Karthik Nachiappan, Jessica Shadian, Don McLain Gill, and Trevor Nieman, and Professor Ari Van Assche as Rapporteur, this session reviewed the IPS's trade and supply chain targets, successes and hurdles (including U.S. tariffs and shifting pacts), and options for diversification and resilience.
The IPS targets geoeconomic goals: spreading trade risks, upholding fair trade rules, and fortifying supply chains to create quality jobs for Canadians.
Progress includes major government trade delegations, expanded offices (now in nearly every regional market, some with multiple cities), and new deals like the Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Indonesia and an upcoming ASEAN free trade accord. Advances with Japan cover defense and nuclear energy, including interest in Canada's reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs).
Private sector efforts are strong: The Canadian Chamber of Commerce partners with regional chambers and organizes targeted business missions.
Opportunities in Southeast Asia include young populations, rising digital use, and focus on climate and energy shifts.
Yet, despite gains and export support, surveys show many Canadian firms eyeing new markets avoid the Indo-Pacific.
Recommendations:
Enhance trade-supporting infrastructure in Canada. Businesses need encouragement that Indo-Pacific entry is rewarding and low-risk.
Forge targeted pacts with aligned nations on digital and green issues. While goods trade with the Indo-Pacific (especially ASEAN) grows, services lag; align digital rules too.
Prioritize investments, including in Canada's North. Infrastructure gaps there could invite instability or foreign influence, like Chinese firms already in critical minerals.
Move beyond bilateral critical minerals deals. Solve issues like pricing coordination, funding, and transparency, perhaps with G7 stockpiling.
Session 3 – Energy Security, Technology, and Innovation
Moderated by Jeff Nankivell, with Rachel McCormick, Nadir Patel, Tuvshinzaya Gantugla, and Yujen Kuo contributing, and Motria Savaryn-Roy as Rapporteur, this session examined the IPS's energy, tech, and innovation goals, Canada's advances in critical minerals, clean energy, AI, and emerging tech, adaptations to global innovation shifts, and future collaboration and security priorities.
The IPS aims to secure energy and resilience: creating trade routes, positioning Canada as a clean energy supplier, and deepening resource links with top Indo-Pacific partners.
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) has broadened from science and economics to geopolitics. Energy and minerals are now security issues; Canada offers reliable supplies with shorter routes for some partners than rivals.
Regional clean energy progress: India's rapid solar/wind adoption, South Korea's hydrogen focus, Japan's balanced nuclear-renewables mix, Vietnam's electronics/renewables hub, Indonesia's EV nickel chains, and Singapore's fintech leadership.
Canada's IPS actions: NRCan boosted presence in Japan and South Korea, improved regional understanding, enabled LNG shipments to Asia, and completed the TMX pipeline for oil exports. Domestic progress includes batteries and partnerships on carbon capture, nuclear, and wind tech.
Energy and innovation converge; clean transitions need digital tools, advanced materials, and data for reliability. Canada can excel here.
Ideas for next steps:
Concentrate on intersections of supply chains, innovation, and rivalry. Expand financial tools like export credit and joint ventures.
Shift to enduring partnerships. No country handles big projects alone; propose Canada-India clean energy corridors or Canada-South Korea hydrogen pilots.
Narrow "critical" minerals to 47 is too broad; focus policies and address niche demands via G7 stockpiles.
Session 4 – Development, Education, and Community Partnerships
Moderated by Professor Victor Ramraj, with Sanjay Ruparelia, Bart Edes, Aries Arugay, and Rohinton Medhora, and David McKinnon as Rapporteur, this session covered Canada's aid, learning exchanges, and societal ties, noting evolving aid landscapes and U.S. shifts, and outlining future focuses for programs, funding, and collaborations.
The IPS commitments: boost educational swaps, empower NGOs, advance Canada's Feminist International Assistance, support regional sustainability, improve visa processes, and enhance skills and human rights.
Though discussions often centered on official ties, the IPS emphasizes whole-society involvement, including universities, civil groups, Indigenous communities, and diaspora. People-to-people bonds are key; building "Asia literacy" among Canadians is a long-haul effort. Canada is diverse but often inward-looking, more Atlantic than Pacific in mindset.
Changing aid context, especially reduced U.S. support, necessitates priority reflection. Canada ranks sixth in OECD overseas development assistance (ODA), but Asia gets little. Upholding human rights, gender equity, and climate aid remains vital despite others pulling back.
Suggestions:
- Lead in redefining global development. Cutting Indo-Pacific aid would weaken influence as others retreat; partner with non-Western donors, regional banks, and leverage international memberships. Review direct NGO funding.
Some warned against tying aid to trade or other goals; merging Canada's aid agency into a broader department in the 2010s diminished its Indo-Pacific role.
Sustain women's and girls' support subtly. Investing in girls' education boosts long-term GDP but avoid preaching; frame it collaboratively.
Harness Canada's Women, Peace, and Security Agenda leadership, positively viewed regionally.
Update views of Indo-Pacific diasporas. Growing Indian and Chinese communities' changing profiles—socio-economically—need better understanding by Canadians and organizations.
Adopt nationwide strategies to promote Canadian universities abroad.
Ensure policy alignment across areas. Link soft power (cultural influence) to hard power issues, with joint regional efforts.
In wrapping up, one might argue that prioritizing niche strengths like DVD could make Canada indispensable in the Indo-Pacific, but does this risk over-relying on technology over traditional alliances? What about the ethics of engaging with minilaterals that might exclude certain players? Do you believe Canada's diaspora should play a bigger role in shaping policy? Or is rethinking the U.S. alliance a necessary evil? Share your opinions below—we'd love to hear differing views!
